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En bref
Grassroots Jordanian activists mobilized popular opposition against a $15 billion deal with Israel to import natural gas, both before and after the deal was signed.
In September 2014, the Jordanian National Electric Power Company signed a letter of intent to import natural gas from the Israeli-controlled Leviathan fields, located offshore in Mediterranean waters. When news of the agreement broke, a massive grassroots campaign arose to oppose the deal, and when the deal was signed two years later, opposition grew ever stronger.
In the first few month of the campaign, a national coalition operating under the name “The Jordanian National Coalition Against Importing Gas from Israel,” consisting of dozens of major political parties, trade unions, grassroots groups, parliamentarians, and others, was formed to consolidate broad yet unified public rejection of the deal (see: PRINCIPLE: If you’re not uncomfortable, your coalition is too small).
Once the battle lines were drawn, very few people wanted to be seen as siding with the villains.
The widespread anger was provoked by the fact that not only would this deal undermine the global efforts of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement to isolate Israel for its violations against the Palestinian indigenous population, but would also threaten Jordan’s economic stability and political sovereignty (see: THEORY: Hamoq and hamas).
The Jordanian regime hoped that the deal would normalize relations with a settler-colonial state and transform its “cold” peace with Israel into a warmer one. In contradiction to the regime’s intentions, however, the deal provoked large numbers of people who had not been engaged in politics to become active organizers against it (see: METHODOLOGY: Spectrum of allies).
The significance of this campaign, which continues to be waged even after the government signed the deal in September 2016, lies in the fact that it represents the longest and most widespread opposition movement in Jordan since the 2011 popular protests during the Arab Spring. The difference is that artivism has played a crucial role in manifesting opposition to the deal. For examples, several video clips (see: TACTIC: Music video) and songs have been produced denouncing the government’s decision. In a truly grassroots tactic of switching off the lights for an hour every Sunday night, artists, comedians, and musicians have performed in candlelight week after week to express their opposition.
Amongst the several active groups in this campaign was the Jordanian chapter of the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement. One of the tactics that Jordan BDS used was phone banking sessions to mobilize members of parliament (see: TACTIC: Phone banking). When the tactic was first used in 2014, it was a huge success that led to forming a broad Parliamentary opposition that voted overwhelmingly not only against the deal but for cancelling the letter of intent. However, the reuse of this tactic in 2016 was not as fruitful, given that a higher vote threshold, and therefore more public pressure on the members of parliament, was required to challenge the government on a binding deal rather than a letter of intent (see: PRINCIPLE: Don’t fall in love with your tactics). The campaign continues at the time of writing, with more innovative ideas and escalatory tactics mushrooming every day (see: PRINCIPLE: Escalate strategically).
Originally published in Beautiful Rising.
Théorie clé
In a state of imminent threat or danger, people will put aside their differences and come together in large numbers to respond to an emergency. When the letter of intent was signed, people expected that a full deal would be reached within a few months, so tremendous numbers of people came forward to mobilize against it. After the threat faded, far fewer people remained part of the day-to-day organizing against the deal.
Tactique clé
Jordanian parliament and elections are not models of democracy: It was highly unusual for large numbers of people to call members of parliament to lobby them on an issue. This novelty made the tactic very effective. Probably for the first time, Jordanian members of parliament were having to defend their position, again and again, to members of the public. At the beginning, it was hard for MPs to believe that the activists calling them were not journalists, but later the phone banking tactic became the major political topic of the season and helped to build strong ties with parliamentarians, some of whom became strong allies of the campaign.
Principes clés
The campaign did not play all its cards at the beginning, as we were aware that we faced a long-term battle. Thus, the campaign began with awareness-raising and challenging government misinformation, expanded to demonstrations and petitions, then to mobilizing the majority of the parliament to vote against the deal and holding a people’s trial against the government. This strategic escalation allowed the campaign to remain sustainable while ensuring that the government and the Jordanian National Electric Power Company continuously felt the heat of the opposition. The bigger the actions and the more ambitious the tactics, the greater the impact they had on the government’s position.
The first thing that campaigners and various groups did was to label the government and the National Electric Power Company as the villains for misleading the public by disseminating false information, and for jeopardizing the sovereignty and independence of the nation. As this framing of the issue became more and more popular, activists were able to persuade the general public to take sides. Once the battle lines were drawn, very few people wanted to be seen as siding with the villains.